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Abstract
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have liberalized markets to improve efficiency and enhance market linkages for
smallholder farmers. The expected positive response by the private sector in areas with limited market infrastructure
has however been disappointing. The functioning of markets is constrained by high transaction costs and coordination
problems along the production-to-consumption value chain. New kinds of institutional arrangements are needed to
reduce these costs and fill the vacuum left when governments withdrew from markets in the era of structural adjustments.
One of these institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and formation of collective
marketing groups as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural economies. The analysis presented here
with a case study from eastern Kenya has shown that while collective action – embodied in Producer Marketing
Groups (PMGs) – is feasible and useful, external shocks and structural constraints that limit the volume of trade and
access to capital and information require investments in complementary institutions and coordination mechanisms to
exploit scale economies. The effectiveness of PMGs was determined by the level of collective action in the form of
increased participatory decision making, member contributions and initial start-up capital. Failure to pay on delivery,
resulting from lack of capital credit, is a major constraint that stifles PMG competitiveness relative to other buyers.
These findings call for interventions that improve governance and participation; mechanisms for improving access to
operating capital; and effective strategies for risk management and enhancing the business skills of the PMGs.
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crops vital to life for the ever-increasing populations of the SAT. ICRISAT’s mission is to conduct
research that can lead to enhanced sustainable production of these crops and to improved
management of the limited natural resources of the SAT. ICRISAT communicates information on
technologies as they are developed through workshops, networks, training, library services and
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The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) is a non-profit,
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Résumé
De nombreux pays de l’Afrique au Sud du Sahara ont libéralisé leur marché dans le but d’améliorer l’efficacité et de
renforcer les liens commerciaux entre les petits exploitants agricoles. La réponse positive que le secteur privé attend
dans les régions où les infrastructures commerciales sont limitées, n’a cependant pas été celle espérée. Le fonctionnement
du marché est limité par les coûts de transaction élevés et par des problèmes de coordination qui se posent tout au long
de la chaîne de valeur production-consommation. Dans cette période d’ajustement structurel, de nouveaux types
d’arrangements institutionnels sont nécessaires pour réduire ces coûts et pour combler le vide laissé par le retrait du
gouvernement des marchés. L’une de ces innovations institutionnelles a consisté à renforcer les associations de
producteurs et la formation de coopératives de commercialisation qui serviront d’instruments permettant de pallier les
lacunes découlant de l’ouverture du marché, dans les économies de type rural. L’analyse présentée – en l’occurrence
une étude de cas du Kenya oriental – a montré que les chocs externes et les contraintes structurelles qui limitent le
volume des échanges commerciaux et l’accès au capital et à l’information, nécessitent des investissements dans des
institutions complémentaires et des mécanismes de coordination de manière à réaliser les économies de marché, même
si l’action collective – incarnée par les coopératives de commercialisation des producteurs (PMG) – est possible et
utile. L’efficacité des PMG est déterminée par le niveau d’action collective, qui prend la forme d’une prise de décision
participative et accrue, par les cotisations des membres et par le capital initial de démarrage. L’incapacité à payer à la
livraison, du fait du manque de crédits importants, est une contrainte majeure qui entrave la compétitivité des groupes
de commercialisation des producteurs par rapport aux autres acheteurs. Ces constats nécessitent : des interventions
permettant d’améliorer la gouvernance et la participation ; des mécanismes visant à faciliter l’accès au fonds
d’exploitation ; des stratégies efficaces pour la gestion des risques et le renforcement des compétences des coopératives
dans le domaine de la pratique des affaires.
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11. Introduction
As part of the structural adjustment program of the 1980s and the 1990s, many sub-Saharan countries have
liberalized their economies and developed poverty reduction strategies that are intended to open new
market-led opportunities for economic growth. However, market liberalization – expected to facilitate the
functioning and effectiveness of markets – have had mixed results (eg, Jayne and Jones 1997; Winter-
Nelson and Temu 2002; Dorward and Kydd 2004; Fafchamps 2004). Moreover, successful implementation
of structural adjustments for poverty reduction requires, among others, good infrastructure and diversified
agriculture (Kydd and Dorward 2004; Dorward et al. 2004b; Dorward et al. 2005). Lack of such economic
transformation after liberalization has been attributed to factors such as partial implementation of reforms
and policy reversals (eg, Jayne et al. 2002; Kherallah et al. 2000; Jayne and Jones 1997) and lack of strong
institutions that support market and private sector development (World Bank 2002a and 2003). In areas with
limited market infrastructure, the argument for lack of economic transformation of agriculture towards more
commercialized production is strongly embedded in the lack of incentives for private sector investment and
the need for proper institutions to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the state.
Nonetheless, liberalization has opened a window of opportunity for smallholder producers hitherto growing
diverse products and supplying small surpluses to markets. The removal of trade barriers and increased
competition has opened some flexibility for farmers to choose buyers for their products and suppliers of key
inputs. But high transaction costs and problems of asymmetric information continue to bedevil smallholder
farmers, especially those with poor access to markets for products, inputs and services. Lack of access to market
infrastructure and geographical isolation either due to remoteness or poor roads and poor communication systems
limit the development of markets. Hence, smallholder producers in these areas are poorly served by agricultural
traders, making local markets thin, less competitive and prices highly dependent on seasons: falling sharply at the
time of harvest and increasing gradually as local supply declines. The lack of competition among buyers, low
local effective demand and covariate risks limit opportunities for farmers to bargain for better prices, which leaves
them to accept low prices for their produce (de Janvry et al. 1991; Kindness and Gordon 2001).
Along the market and value chain, processors and traders are constrained by low quality grain,
inadequate supply and high cleaning costs whereas market intermediaries in the supply chain face high
assembly costs, high market risk and cash flow problems. These factors deprive farmers of the underlying
incentives to produce and supply quality and differentiated products with desirable market traits in addition
to their inability to penetrate high value niche markets (Jones et al. 2002). This indicates that small-scale,
dispersed and unorganized producers are unlikely to exploit market opportunities as they cannot attain the
necessary economies of scale and lack bargaining power in negotiating prices. This reduces their ability to
compete with well established large scale producers and farmers in more-favored areas to harness available
and emerging market opportunities (Johnson and Berdegue 2004). One viable strategy for such producers
would be to evolve new collective forms of organization that would help them reduce transaction costs and
benefit from better bargaining power in marketing their produce and procuring production inputs.
Producer or farmer organizations refer to the various forms of organizations that perform diverse
functions such as analysis, advocacy, economic (production and marketing) and local development
(Stockbridge et al. 2003). They are grounded on the principle of collective action among potential
beneficiaries. Collective action occurs when individuals voluntarily cooperate as a group and coordinate
their behavior in solving a common problem. In broad terms, collective action may be defined as action
taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived
shared interest (Marshall 1998), which fits well in the traditional African setting. In the absence of well
functioning markets, African farmers have traditionally relied on kinship and other forms of reciprocal
relationships in production, marketing and other social activities (Fafchamps and Minten 1999;
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2Gabre-Madhin 2001). There is a potential that such informal institutions and relationships can form the
basis for enhancing market access and entrepreneurial skills through collective action. However, collective
action in marketing requires closer coordination of production and postharvest activities to ensure delivery
of high quality and homogeneous products. Moreover, new forms of organization among small and spatially
dispersed producers involve transaction costs and require good leadership and development of new skills in
business and agro-enterprise development. The negative experiences of cooperatives in the past attest to the
importance of these factors in farmer organization, management and resilience (Lele 1981).
If new forms of organization and market institutions are going to help reduce transaction costs and
enhance market opportunities for the poor, there is a need to understand how such collective action evolves
and how it is sustained; the determinants of farmer participation; alternative forms of organization that may
enhance performance and effectiveness; and the complementary institutions and the policy support needed
for the effectiveness of collective marketing groups.
This paper aims to review the conceptual issues surrounding imperfect markets in smallholder
agriculture and the role that institutional and organizational innovations can play in improving the
performance of rural markets. With a case study of producer marketing groups in eastern Kenya, the paper
offers new insights on the potentials and constraints of rural institutions in providing market services. The
analysis highlights marketing outcomes and the potential sources of differential success of marketing
groups in relation to marketing and other stated functions. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1
introduces the background; and Section 2 reviews market institutions and their emerging roles in remedying
market imperfections or failures in rural areas. Section 3 outlines the methodological approach used in the
case study. Section 4 discusses the key results, while Section 5 presents analyses of policy and institutional
issues that affect the development of collective marketing groups. The main lessons and policy conclusions
are found in the concluding section.
2. Institutions for improving markets
2.1. Market imperfection and the role of institutions
Institutions are defined in many different ways. The most widely quoted one is by North (1990) which
defines institutions as humanly devised constraints, made up of formal constraints (ie, rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (ie, norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct)
that structure human interactions, and their enforcement characteristics. These constraints and the
technology employed determine the transaction and transformation costs that add up to the production and
marketing costs. Following North (1990), Dorward et al. (2005) define institutions as “rules of the game”
that define the incentives and sanctions affecting people’s behavior and distinguish institutional
arrangement as sets of rules and structures that govern particular contracts, and the context within which the
contracts are governed. The World Bank (2002a) offers a working definition of institutions as rules,
enforcement mechanisms and organizations that promote market transactions. These definitions indicate
that institutions provide multiple functions to markets; they transmit information, mediate transactions,
facilitate the transfer and enforcement of property rights and contracts, and manage the degree of
competition. Along with these concepts, we define market institutions as rules of the game, enforcement
mechanisms and organizations that facilitate market interaction, coordination, contract formation and
enforcement.
Market failures are caused by asymmetric information, high transaction costs and imperfectly specified
property rights. These market deficiencies are more pronounced in rural areas with under-developed road
and communication networks and other market infrastructure. Where supporting market institutions are
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3lacking, rural markets in areas with low market infrastructure tend to be very thin and imperfect. In the
absence of institutions that help to coordinate marketing functions or to link producers to markets, the
associated high transportation costs and transaction costs undermine the processes of exchange (Kranton
1996; Gabre-Madhin 2001) and result in limited or localized markets with little rural–urban linkages
(Chowdhury et al. 2005). In such circumstances, households produce only a limited range of goods and
services for their own consumption because social protection for food security is not provided through
markets and government interventions (de Janvry et al. 1991). Shocks and vulnerability to production risk
(ie, weather, pests and sickness) and market risk (ie, price) that seem systemic to agriculture also lead to
imperfect markets and transaction failures (Dorward and Kydd 2004).
When high transaction costs, asymmetric information and incomplete property rights impede the functioning
of markets, market players fail to undertake profitable investments (due to the absence of complementary
investments) leading to coordination failures that hinder market functions (Dorward et al. 2003; Dorward et al.
2005; Poulton et al. 2006). Thus coordination failure along the production-to-consumption value chain may
explain constrained agricultural development and the prevalence of a low equilibrium trap1, which is a big
challenge to policy (Dorward et al. 2003). Overcoming the effects of such market imperfections in agricultural
input and output markets would therefore require a deliberate attempt to strengthen institutions that promote
coordination of market functions, reduce transaction costs and integrate markets to facilitate a continual transition
to a higher level equilibrium (World Bank 2002b).
Various private and public sector market-supporting institutions and institutional arrangements have
been proposed to bridge market imperfections, reduce transaction costs, enhance opportunities for the poor
in markets and to make the market systems more inclusive and integrated (World Bank 2002a). Among the
potential market-supporting institutions can that enhance market functions in rural areas are farmer
organizations such as Producer Marketing Groups (PMGs). Their potential in this process lies in enabling
contractual links to input and output markets (Coulter et al. 1999); promoting economic coordination in
liberalized markets (Rondot and Collion 1999); and in leveraging market functions for smallholder farmers.
However, their success in this process depends on their ability in conveying market information;
coordinating marketing functions; defining and enforcing property rights and contracts; facilitating
smallholder competitiveness in markets (World Bank 2002a), and more critically in mobilizing their
members to engage in markets.
2.2. Farmer organizations and marketing
Historically, farmer cooperatives were introduced in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the colonial period
for the purpose of promoting production of cash crops by peasant farmers (Hussi et al. 1993). After
independence, many governments as well as donors promoted cooperatives and other rural organizations as
a potential source of decentralized grassroots participation in agricultural credit, input and commodity
markets (Lele and Christiansen 1989; Hussi et al. 1993). Their performances were mixed. In Kenya, for
example, semi-autonomous agencies – such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), and the
coffee and dairy cooperatives – were important to the growth of smallholder production, while some
parastatals and cooperatives showed mediocre record. The mediocre performances were attributable to
technological problems and poor management (Wolf 1986; Lele and Christiansen 1989)
Generally, the performance of farmer cooperatives in relation to poverty reduction and provision of
essential services has not been exemplary (Lele 1981; Hussi et al. 1993; Akwabi-Ameyaw 1997). Supported
by governments, they functioned primarily as service cooperatives rather than as business enterprises
1 The low equilibrium trap is a steady state situation resulting from low levels of investment that tend to sustain imperfect markets and poverty
(Hoff 2001).
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4owned and managed by the members. They were not allowed sufficient marketing margins to cover their
operational expenses and could, therefore, not evolve into commercially viable enterprises. This
compromised their inherent character as member-controlled organizations which in turn discouraged
member participation and eroded confidence in the leadership. With structural adjustment and economic
reforms, many of the service cooperatives lost their special protection from the state, which further reduced
their viability in the ensuing competitive environment (Lele 1981).
For cooperatives and rural organizations to be effective in serving a broad set of socio-political and
economic objectives of small producers, new policies and institutional reforms are needed to facilitate their
transformation from public sector service providers to private sector enterprises with clear business plans.
With hindsight, farmer organizations tend to succeed only when: farmers can manage them autonomously
with minimal government interference; farmers participate actively in decision making at every stage of the
process; and their cooperative activities are profitable (World Bank 1995).
A strong justification for farmer organizations is their potential to play a critical role in both the delivery
and coordination of services to smallholder producers (Dorward et al. 2004b). They can facilitate collective
marketing of agricultural outputs that will help reduce transaction costs related to the marketing of agricultural
inputs and small marketable surplus emanating from a large number of widely dispersed small producers.
Collective marketing allows small-scale farmers to spread the costs of marketing, enhance their ability to
negotiate for better prices, and improve their market power. Furthermore, climatic variability in semi-arid
areas increases the variability of supply and prices because effective demand is limited, and small-scale
farmers are often unable to sell to consumers outside of their local markets. Through coordination of marketing
activities, PMGs could facilitate access to better markets, reduce marketing costs, and synchronize buying and
selling practices to seasonal price conditions. PMGs can shorten the marketing chains by linking producers
more directly to the upper end of the marketing chain (Figure 1). Well organized farmers will be able to bypass
brokers or assemblers, rural wholesalers and transporters who now procure grain directly from farmers, and
connect directly with the urban high value retailers and processors or exporters. This can be done through
various contractual arrangements, including outgrower schemes or postharvest bulk delivery.
In many rural areas, commercial inputs are either unaffordable or smallholder farmers face high
transaction costs, which further undermines their ability to use such inputs. The high input costs for small
quantities resulting from high transaction and transportation costs are likely to make investments in
commercial inputs uneconomical to many smallholder farmers. Farmer marketing groups can however
facilitate input and output markets access and service delivery, thus promoting commercial activities and
technological change in agriculture (Kindness and Gordon 2001). However, for these organizations to be
beneficial to farmers, governments need to provide complimentary public goods that would empower small
producers to participate in markets (Kelly et al. 2003).
2.3. Evolution and development of farmer marketing groups
Farmer marketing groups as an outcome of collective action are unlikely to emerge on their own (Johnson et
al. 2002). The need for collective action depends on the resource type, degree of spatial integration and the
time required in achieving the desired outcomes. Controlling for conducive environment and political
leaderships, White and Runge (1995) have shown that groups will emerge and survive where a “critical
mass” of individuals have practical knowledge of the potential gains from collective action, but that in the
short term emergence can be constrained by landscape factors that affect the potential net gain, and socio-
cultural factors that influence the cost of constructing the new institution. It follows therefore that both
micro and macro factors are important determinants of the evolution and the need for collective action.
Additionally, an individual’s choice to participate in collective action will depend on his/her expectation of
other members’ behavior.
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5Collective action in marketing is likely to occur if expected benefits from lower business transaction
costs, better prices for inputs and outputs and/or empowerment and capacity enhancement outweigh the
associated costs of complying with collective rules and norms. If the expected cooperation benefits are
lower than the expected costs, households are unlikely to participate in group marketing activities.
Successful collective action based on membership will, therefore, depend on the potential that group action
will improve the members’ expected net benefit streams above and beyond what can be achieved without
such collective action. In semi-arid areas where spatially dispersed farm households produce small
quantities for markets, individual net gain from collective marketing is likely to be low and unlikely to
outweigh the costs unless the size of the group is large enough to minimize unit costs. This observation
points to the fundamental role of improving agricultural productivity and reducing production risk in these
areas so as to create opportunities for market development.
Nevertheless, the costs and benefits are likely to differ across households depending on location,
volume of production, asset endowment, education and managerial skills (Staal et al. 1997; Hollway and
Ehui 2002; Kerr et al. 2002). Since the benefits of farmer marketing groups are unlikely to be equally
distributed, some households may not find them useful unless some interventions are designed to enhance
their participation – suggesting that individual participation in farmer organizations is an endogenous
process that may vary across households.
Figure 1. Marketing channels and value chains for grains and the role of PMGs.
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6The potential for accessing essential services to improve agricultural incomes and tapping economic
opportunities will act as a strong incentive for anyone contemplating membership. Existing skills/
experience of members in relation to what is required to undertake joint activities; internal cohesion and
membership driven agenda; and the ability to effectively integrate into a wider commercial economy will
determine the effectiveness of collective marketing activities (Stringfellow et al. 1997). This implies that
measures designed to enhance farmer marketing group capacities will contribute to the success of producer
marketing groups. Therefore programs that are geared towards facilitating groups’ self reliance and
enhancing organizational and management skills are likely to equip groups with the capacity to forge
effective business interactions with the private sector for agricultural development (Bingen et al. 2003).
Despite the potential gains from collective action, individual cooperative behavior may not be
translated into collective action unless other potential beneficiaries agree to cooperate and do likewise. The
presence and assurance of trust between and among individuals facilitates the potential for reciprocity and
emergence of cooperative behavior (Runge 1981; White and Runge 1995). It follows, thus, that
interventions which enhance trust among members in a group, including laws of engagement and
operational democracy, are likely to contribute to successful collective action. The functional orientation of
farmer groups and their internal features are also important determinants of the success of farmer
organizations (Coulter et al. 1999). Larger groups may be less successful than small groups in furthering
their interest but only up to a certain level. This is mainly because the transaction and managerial costs of
cooperation increase faster than the gains as group size increases beyond a certain level (Hussi et al. 1993),
which means that optimal group size will depend on the type of activity and the features of the group.
3. The case study
In order to examine the relevance of the above reviewed conceptual issues and assess the constraints and
opportunities for farmer organizations to facilitate market access for the poor, a study was conducted in two
districts of eastern Kenya (Mbeere and Makueni). The two districts are located in part of the larger semi-arid
lands where market infrastructure is poor (Appendix 1) and farmers produce limited marketable surplus.
They are characterized by low density paved roads and limited access to major marketing centers. Although
climatic variability is a typical characteristic of these areas with recurrent droughts, smallholder agriculture
is almost entirely dependent on rains.
The study capitalizes on two rounds of data sets collected in the two districts: a baseline and a follow-up
survey. The baseline survey of 400 households (240 in Mbeere and 160 in Makueni) was undertaken in 2003
before the PMGs were formed as part of a research project that aimed to test alternative institutional
arrangements for improving market access for smallholders. The households were randomly sampled from a
list of all households in the targeted villages. Farmers were sensitized and assisted2 to form PMGs with the
view to test the potential of these groups to improve market access for smallholder farmers. Communities
managed to voluntarily establish five PMGs in each of the two districts. Consequently, the groups were
formally registered and provided with a certificate of legal constitution issued by the Ministry of Culture and
Social Services. After registration some of the households who had expressed interest in joining the groups
decided not join. From the initial sample of 400 households, the distribution of members and non-members
was decided later, after the PMGs were established with committed members who paid the registration fees
and/or annual contributions to the group (Table 1). Information collected during the baseline survey included
poverty indicators; production levels of dryland crops; market participation by households; and adoption of
agricultural technologies.
2 The form of assistance provided included bringing the farmers together to discuss production and marketing strategies for dryland legumes; to
identify production and marketing constraints and opportunities; training in quality seed production and marketing; and provision of information
in organizing marketing groups. No direct subsidies or incentives were provided to farmers to join groups.
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7During the follow-up survey conducted in 2005, data were collected at three levels: the community or
village, the PMG and the farm household. At the community or village level, a total of 20 communities/villages
(two from each PMG) were purposively selected for the survey based on villages that had the highest number
of registered members in their respective PMGs. Thereafter, a group of about nine gender-balanced key
informants were selected from each village based on peer perception and the village chief’s advice on their
ability to provide quality information about the village. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to
the informants to obtain data on demographic and resource use, socioeconomic conditions, trends and the
overall economic profiles of the PMG villages. At the PMG level, all the ten PMGs were surveyed separately.
Based on advice from community elders and the village chief, a group of five to seven respondents comprising
of PMG management and ordinary members were selected from each PMG as key informants. A semi-
structured questionnaire was administered to obtain data on the objectives and aspirations of the groups when
they were formed; general group characteristics (eg, size and composition, frequency of meetings and capital);
asset ownership (eg, store, weighing scales and operating capital); credit access; bulking and marketing;
governance; major constraints limiting group performance and planned activities.
At the household level, data were collected on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, crop
and livestock production and marketing activities, household assets, credit and savings, access to
information and participation in collective marketing or awareness of collective marketing groups and
perception of anticipated benefits among non-members. A total of 400 randomly selected households in the
PMG villages, comprising of 250 members and 150 non PMG members, were surveyed (210 from Mbeere
district and 190 from Makueni district). These 400 randomly selected households included 250 households
from the baseline survey3.
The primary data were subjected to qualitative and quantitative analyses. Simple descriptive statistics
were used to analyze the socioeconomic and biophysical profiles of the PMG villages. In particular, they
were used to assess the prevalence and levels of poverty, market participation and resource management
conditions in the PMG villages. The PMG data were analyzed to understand market functions and
Table 1. Household sampling and sample sizes for 2003 and 2005 surveys.
Total# Members Non-members
District PMG 2003 2005 2003# 2005 2003# 2005
Mbeere Kamwiyendeyi 80 50 58 30 22 20
Kilia 80 50 45 30 35 20
Makima 80 50 31 30 49 20
Nthingini* - 30 - 20 - 10
Wango* - 30 - 20 - 10
Makueni Thavu 80 50 43 30 37 20
Emali 80 50 58 30 22 20
Kathonzweni* - 30 - 20 - 10
Kampi Ya Mawe* - 30 - 20 - 10
Kalamba* - 30 - 20 - 10
Total 400 400 235 250 165 150
* A baseline survey was not conducted in these PMG villages in 2003 because they were included in the project only after the survey was
conducted in the initial five target villages.
# The number of PMG members in 2003 is based on later classification of the baseline data into PMG members and non-members after the
PMGs were clearly established. The 2005 survey covered all the PMG villages and sampled from members and non-members.
Source: Household survey 2003 & 2005
3 This sub-sample consists of 150 households re-sampled from 235 baseline households that had remained PMG members and 100 households
re-sampled from 165 households that had remained non-PMG members (see Table 1). The panel data can be used to evaluate potential changes
on marketing activities and livelihoods. Due to space limitations, this analysis is not pursued in this study.
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8performance of PMGs; to determine governance problems and the level of collective action; to identify
indicators of collective action; and the effectiveness of collective action in marketing functions and the
associated factors that affect group performance. Household data were used to examine the marketing
channels and market actors along the value chain, and to establish the market shares, volumes and prices
offered by different agents to farmers. An econometric model was estimated to determine factors that influence
unit price of point transactions; to establish whether prices offered to smallholder farmers by different market
participants and particularly by the PMGs, controlling for other factors, would be significantly different; and to
test whether PMGs pay higher mean prices with lower variance than other buyers.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Socioeconomic profiles of PMG villages
The overall level of market access in the PMG villages is very poor. The level of accessibility is relatively good
during the dry seasons but the roads are usually impassable during the rainy season. The average distance from
the PMG stores to the nearest market was about 9 km and ranged between 0 km (eg, Makima and
Kathonzweni) to 20 km (eg, Kilia), while the distance from the PMG stores to the district commercial centre
was between 11 km for Kampi Ya Mawe (KYM) and 150 km for Nthingini (Table 2 and Appendix 1). This
confirms the high level of transportation costs and transaction costs faced by small producers in these areas.
Table 2. Socioeconomic profile of the PMGs.
Distance to
Nearest grain district
Female Initial wholesaler commercial Distance to
PMG Group size members (%) capital (Ksh#) market (km) centre (km) Nairobi (km)
Mbeere district
Wango 116 62 8170 14 100 101
Nthingini 123 75 2620 11 150 120
Kilia 184 61 2800 20 80 118
Kamwiyendeyi 112 67 2640 4 120 93
Makima 50 40 17700 0 42 160
Makueni district
Emali 164 46 16000 9 50 118
Thavu 120 17 4062 7 30 160
Kathonzweni 68 75 600 0 25 168
Kalamba 47 93 600 15 26 134
KYM* 65 49 1480 11 11 150
Average 105 58 5667 9 63 132
*
 Kampi Ya Mawe
# Kenyan Shilling
Source: PMG survey 2005
The proportion of households that produced surplus cereals and legumes were generally higher in
Mbeere district than in Makueni. However, the proportion of households that produced surplus cereals and
legumes significantly declined when the 2004/05 production year is compared to the situation in 1995. This
may be attributed to drought that prevailed in 2004, which drastically reduced market participation
(Table 3). In contrast, a high proportion of households now use fertilizer and manure compared to 10 years
earlier. The proportion of households in Mbeere using fertilizer rose from 1 to 5% over the past 10 years. In
Makueni this proportion increased from 0 to 3% over the same period. Drought risk is a major factor
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9limiting fertilizer use on rainfed crops. It reduces total production and hence marketed surplus of food crops
grown in these areas. A comparison between cereal and legume surplus producing households reveals a
relatively higher percentage of households producing surplus cereals than legumes. This could be attributed
to most legumes being susceptible to drought compared to cereals and also to a proportionately larger land
area devoted to cereals than legumes.
The level of poverty in the PMG villages is very high. A significant proportion (60-70%) of households is
below the poverty line4 and relies primarily on subsistence agriculture. Landlessness is relatively low
(1-11%) but land productivity is limited by biophysical factors and low level of technology adoption (Table 4).
The higher level of landlessness (11%) in Mbeere district is attributable to high population density and some
immigrants from neighboring districts like Embu and Kirinyaga who are attracted by the farming opportunities
on government owned land schemes. About 54% and 43% of the households owned oxen and sheep in 1995
respectively. However, in 2005 these proportions declined to 45% and 23%. This could be a reflection of
increasing scarcity of grazing lands due to population growth and also due to some level of distress-selling of
livestock due to recurrent droughts. The decline in ownership of oxen and the proportion of households who
lack these assets (55%) is particularly damaging as land is primarily cultivated using oxen-drawn ploughs.
Goats were owned by about 78% of households in both periods which shows that they are a popular form of
investment in the semi-arid areas.
Table 3. Household market participation, marketed surplus and resource management conditions
(%) in PMG villages.
Mbeere Makueni Total
Issue 1995 2005 1995 2005  1995 2005
Produce surplus for markets (cereals) 44 19 29 10 36 14
Produce surplus for markets (legumes) 44 16 22 7 33 11
Using farmyard manure 30 67 38 65 33 66
Using mineral fertilizer 1 5 0 3 1 4
Using field pesticides 22 75 25 46 24 61
Using storage pesticides 21 70 41 73 31 72
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 4. Poverty profiles and technology adoption in PMG villages.
Mbeere Makueni Total
Issue 1995 2005 1995 2005  1995 2005
Average number of households per village 199 283 68 115 134 199
Landless households (%) 12 11 0 1 6 6
Households owning local cows (%) 69 57 53 59 61 58
Households owning improved cows (%) 0 9 3 3 2 7
Households owning oxen (%) 62 49 47 42 54 45
Households owning sheep (%) 44 24 42 22 43 23
Households owning goats (%) 78 74 79 83 79 78
Source: PMG survey 2005
4 The key informants in each village were asked to state a monthly income that would define the local poverty line based on average family sizes
in the areas. The mean estimated poverty line was Ksh 5075 per month. This translates to about Ksh 31 per person per day, which is equivalent
to USD 0.44 ($1 = Ksh 70). This is lower than the rural poverty line per capita income of Ksh 41 ($0.6) defined by the government of Kenya
(Republic of Kenya 2000).
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4.2. Aspirations of PMGs
The stated objectives of the PMGs ranged from better prices for their produce, access to inputs,
development of business skills, knowledge sharing and transformation to business entities where
membership can acquire shares. Obtaining better prices for local produce was the most frequently stated
objective pursued by all PMGs followed by development of business skills (50%), access to better inputs
(40%), increased commercialization of production (30%), transformation to business entities (10%) and
sharing knowledge and information (10%) (Table 5). Low and variable grain prices and high transaction
costs for local produce seem to drive the interest to work as a group.
Table 5. PMG objectives and aspirations.
Stated objective % cases (n = 10)
Obtain better prices 100
Access training and other assistance 50
Access improved seed and other inputs 40
Increased commercialization of production 30
Establish business entities with share capital 10
Share knowledge and information 10
n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Grain prices fluctuate significantly according to local supply and demand conditions in local markets.
For example, pigeonpea prices were lowest during harvesting (July – September) and highest during
planting period (October – December) (Figure 2). The average price variation was about Ksh 13/kg.
Accordingly maize prices were quite low (January – March) coinciding with the harvest of the short rains
season crop followed by the harvest of the main rains season crop (July – September), but higher during the
intervening periods when local supply is limited (Figure 3). The mean maize price variability was Ksh
11.30. Although these price fluctuations can be explained by the supply and demand conditions, the results
also reflect the vulnerability of farmers in marginal areas to price variations which is aggravated by
recurrent droughts.
Figure 2. Seasonal price fluctuations for dry pigeonpea (Ksh/kg).
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Figure 3. Seasonal price fluctuations for maize (Ksh/kg).
Half the PMGs aspire to access training in business and entrepreneurial skills for agribusiness and
enterprise development. This is consistent with the need to manage the PMG business enterprises to enhance
economic efficiency and competitiveness. The stated objective of access to commercial inputs and
commercialization of agriculture are correlated and show that smallholders are keen to benefit from market
opportunities. Some of the PMGs plan to establish a business enterprise with share capital, a long term goal
that they may move towards as collective action becomes more effective.
When asked whether they had achieved their stated objectives, a majority of the PMGs reported that
they had partly achieved them while those that had not achieved any, were working towards those goals
despite several constraints. The reasons for non-achievement of the objectives included lack of credit, lack
of ready markets, drought, poor PMG leadership and conduct of members, lack of capacity to identify and
collect market information,  and price fluctuations in that order of descending importance. The groups were
further asked whether they intended to expand group functions into new directions. Several of them
indicated their willingness to broaden operations by expanding into other related activities. In order of
importance (measured by median rankings), the PMGs aspire to participate in the marketing of agricultural
inputs (1.5), marketing of alternative high value crops (eg, vegetables and groundnuts) (2.5), watershed
management (3.5) and value addition (4.5) (Table 6). Although there is variation in the rankings on some of
the activities across districts, the results suggest that the PMGs intend to diversify more into linked activities
where they have gained experience and skills, with limited interest to establish backward linkages along the
pre-production to marketing and consumption value chain (eg, collective watershed management).
4.3. Governance of PMGs
An important aspect of governance of PMGs is their constitution (by-laws) that define the norms of
operations, the roles and responsibilities of various organs and members versus the management that
oversees the running of the PMGs on behalf of members. All the PMGs had written by-laws governing the
running of their groups. The by-laws stressed more on the obligations of the members to the group but were
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relatively silent on the obligations of the group to members. For example, the by-laws require that members
sell their grain through the PMG, make requisite payments and/or contributions, prioritize farming of
marketable crops (eg, pigeonpea) and contribute actively to the development of the group. Successful
governance can be inferred from the level of adherence to the by-laws. On average about 77% of active
members abided by established by-laws. Violations of by-laws was associated with a number of reasons
including ignorance about the by-laws, cash constraints to honor their payment obligations, lack of trust in
the PMG leadership, and lack of commitment to the PMG cause (Table 7). It was stated that those members
who violated the by-laws were either fined or expelled, especially if they were repeat offenders.
Table 6. Ranking of PMG interests and priorities to expand group activities (where 1 = most
important).
Activity Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Agricultural input marketing 3.0 (2) 1.8 (1) 2.4 (1.5)
Marketing new high value crops 3.4 (4) 21.6 (2) 12.5 (2.5)
Watershed management 3.4 (4) 2.8 (3) 3.1 (3.5)
Value addition or processing 6.8 (8) 3.0 (3) 4.9 (4.5)
Recruiting more members 4.6 (3) 6 (6) 5.3 (5)
Live animals 5.8 (6) 24.8 (7) 15.3 (6)
Marketing livestock products 24.4 (7) 24 (6) 24.2 (6)
Figures in parenthesis are medians; n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 7. Reasons PMG members state for not following by-laws.
Reason % of cases
Lack of awareness of by-laws 63
Lack of trust in group leadership and vision 63
Too busy with other commitments 38
Cash constraints (to pay PMG fees) 38
Lack of commitment to PMG goods 13
Source: PMG survey 2005
The PMGs had executive committees that were elected through a non-secret vote counting process and
given the responsibility of running the affairs of the PMGs on behalf of the members.5 The membership of
these committees included the chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer, vice
treasurer, marketing representative and a varying number of ordinary members. The mean annual executive
meetings were 15 with a median of 12 (Table 8). The groups had convened five (in Mbeere) to six (in
Makueni) general assembly meetings since their formation. The proportion of members attending the
general assembly meetings ranged from 42% in Makueni to 63% in Mbeere. Regarding governance and
management qualities of the PMG leadership, the respondents ranked several attributes of the office bearers
or management systems in order of importance. These included quality of the chairperson (median = 2)
followed by the quality of the executive committee (median = 2.5) while transparency in accounting, rules
and norms for coordination, and rules and norms for conflict resolution, with a median of 3, were equally
ranked (Table 9).
5 It is possible that non-secret ballots could be vulnerable to manipulation and rent-seeking behavior that may reduce the performance of farmer
organizations (eg, Mude 2006). While most PMG leaders were elected through an open vote counting process, some of them adopted a consensus
approach through acclamation. There is a need to institute proper democratic procedures that determine the period of service and allow
unhindered expression of choice of leaders by the members.
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4.4. PMGs, markets and marketing channels
The PMGs are expected to play a primary role in facilitating the integration of small producers into well
functioning markets. Using data from the household survey, we analyzed the market structure in terms of
transactions (number of sales and volume) by distance and market participants during 2003/2004 trade year.
The results show that rural wholesalers accounted for 45% of transactions and 49% of the volume traded
while brokers/assemblers accounted for 38% of the transactions and of the traded volume (Table 10). PMGs
accounted for 4% of the sales and 2% of the volume and rural consumers (ie, farmers who are deficit
producers) accounted for less than 10% of the sales and volume purchased from farmers. The low market
share of the PMGs in the marketing chain can be attributed to their inability to pay immediately after grain
delivery making them less attractive to cash-constrained farmers. Schools also bought grain for the “school
feeding program” that accounted for 3% of the transactions and 2% of the volume traded. The results further
indicate that 45% of the traded volume and 36% of the transactions were conducted at the farmgate. It is also
evident that rural wholesalers and brokers/assemblers jointly control more than 80% of the transactions and
traded volumes. This shows that these marketing channels are the easily available options to farmers in
remote areas. The rural brokers/assemblers are well organized buyers with the necessary capital and
mobility to buy directly from dispersed farmers. The rural wholesalers do not buy as much as brokers/
assemblers at the farmgate mainly because they are less mobile and often require farmers to bring their
produce to their trading points.
About 34% of the transactions, which accounted for 25% of the traded volume, were
conducted within 3 km off farmgate. Although the transactions at the two points were not very
different, the differential in traded volume is large, showing that at large distances, small volumes are
transacted. This evidence attests to the fact that large distances can lead to incomplete markets as
farmers attempt to economize on transportation costs, especially when prices do
not increase significantly with distance to compensate for the added costs (Key et al. 2000).
Table 8. PMG meetings and attendance levels in two districts.
Meeting type Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Executive meetings since establishment 16 (12) 14 (12) 15 (12)
Executive meetings attendance (%) 72 65 69
General assembly meetings since establishment 7 (5) 9 (6) 8 (6)
General assembly meetings in 2004 3 (3) 5 (3) 4 (3)
General assembly meetings attendance in 2004 (%) 63 42 52
Figures in parenthesis are medians; n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 9. Mean and median ranking of factors important for PMG governance and management
(where 1 = excellent).
Attribute Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Quality of the chairperson 2.6 (2) 2.2 (2) 2.4 (2)
Transparency in accounting 2.6 (3) 2.2 (2) 2.4 (2.5)
Quality of the executive committee 3 (3) 2.8 (3) 2.9 (3)
Rules and norms for coordination 2.8 (3) 3 (3) 2.9 (3)
Rules and norms for conflict resolution 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3)
n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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It is important to note that with increasing distance from the farmgate, the number of transactions and
volumes traded by market participant decline. This can be attributed to the increasing transportation and
transaction costs for the small quantities marketed and is consistent with the findings by Fafchamps and Hill
(2005), which show that selling directly to markets (where farmers can get a higher price but must incur a
transport cost) is more likely when the quantity sold is large and the market is close by. This further indicates
a potential business opportunity for PMGs through bulk selling.
To illustrate the market transactions by different market participants in terms of prices, market shares, and
also the effect of drought, we present the case of pigeonpea for 2003 and 2005 (Table 11). The results show that
the drought situation that prevailed in 2004 had significantly depressed the marketed surplus and the number of
transactions6. While the number of transactions declined from 243 in 2003 to just 50 in 2005, traded volume
declined from about 41 tons to 4.7 tons. This drastic change in market participation is significant given that
pigeonpea is one of the most drought-tolerant crops grown in these areas. When we look at the prices offered
by the different buyers, the PMG prices (Ksh 27/kg) were higher than all other agents. The prices paid by the
other agents seem to be relatively similar (Ksh 23-25/kg). Does this indicate that the PMGs (after having
covered their marketing and administration costs) indeed pay a statistically higher price with lower variance
than the other buyers?
Statistical and econometric methods were used to test these effects. An F-test using analyses of
variance methods confirmed that the mean prices offered by different buyers varied significantly across
buyers of maize, beans, and greengram whereas a Bartlett test for equal variance (Ho: unit price variances
across buyers are equal) was rejected (at 5% level) for most crops other than cotton (see Appendix 2). The
group variance comparison test was used to check whether the PMGs helped to reduce price instability or
variability. This was done only for pigeonpea and greengram, the two crops that the PMGs bought in
2005. The null hypotheses of equal variance in the pigeonpea prices of PMGs and other buyers (rural
assemblers/brokers and rural wholesalers) were not rejected at 5% level. For greengram, the results show
that the PMG prices seemed to have higher variability compared to prices paid by rural wholesalers.
However, the null hypothesis of equal variance was not rejected when PMG greengram price was
compared to that of rural assemblers/brokers. This suggests that while PMGs may offer higher mean
prices to member farmers, the effect on price stabilization is unlikely to be evident in the cross-sectional
data used here.
In order to test whether the average prices paid by the PMGs were statistically different after controlling
for other factors, we estimated an econometric model for actual prices received by farmers. The model
dependent variable was the unit price received by farmers for different crops in different markets located at
varying distances from the farm (including the farmgate). The model explanatory variables included: amount
sold, amount sold squared, distance to the point of sell, dummy variables for the type of crop sold (bean,
pigeonpea, greengram, cowpea, cotton and vegetables), the quality of grain sold, the type of buyer (PMG,
consumer, rural wholesaler, urban trader, ginnery, school), season the grain was sold, gender of household
head, level of education of the household head, access to information and fixed district level effects. A detailed
description of these variables is given in Table 12.
The estimated model was significant (P < 0.001) and explained about 61% of the variation
(R2 = 0.612). The model results show that farmer grain prices are significantly determined by the distance to
the point of transaction, the type of crop sold, location by district, buyer type (particularly consumers,
PMGs and schools) and the season the grain is sold. Unit prices were positively correlated with distance
6 Meteorological data show that the average annual rainfall for Makueni (2004) was about 468 mm, which is well below the minimum rainfall of
about 650 mm required for agricultural production in these areas. While farmers also reported drought conditions in Mbeere in 2004, the severity
seems to be lower than in Makueni.
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(Table 13). Specifically, prices seem to increase by about Ksh 0.2 for every 10 km traveled from the
farmgate (P < 0.1). The effect of distance is interesting: while prices seem to increase as distance increases,
the price change for the range of distances covered in this study (less than 10 km) does not seem to be
significant enough to create incentives for small producers to travel long distances for grain marketing. The
small price gain is likely to be muted by the associated transportation costs unless the quantity sold is large
enough to exploit economies of scale. This seems to explain why most farmers prefer to sell the grain at the
farmgate (see Tables 10 and 11). After controlling for the crop type, season, quality and type of buyer,
amount sold does not seem to have a significant effect on prices received by farmers. While price and
volume sold seem to be negatively correlated the relationship is not significant. This indicates that
smallholders are price takers and volumes from individual farmers are too small to influence market prices.
The prices vary significantly across crops (P < 0.01). In relation to maize (reference crop) the price
variation ranges from Ksh 4/kg for cowpea (Cowpea) to about Ksh 15/kg for beans (Beans). Pigeonpea and
greengram – two predominant cash crops in the study districts – sell at Ksh 12 over and above the price for
maize while chickpea fetches about Ksh 14/kg more than maize. An interesting result is that grain quality
does not seem to matter in price determination (the price differential between above average quality and
Table 12. Description of regression model variables (n = 624).
Variable name Description Mean Minimum Maximum
Price (dependent) Unit price (Ksh/kg) 19.24 6 50
Sold Amount sold (kg) 324.95 3 6000
Sold squared Amount sold squared (1000 kg) 439 0.009 36,000
Distance Distance to sales point (km) 4.6 0 400
Maize (reference) Maize (1 = maize, 0 = otherwise) 0.46 0 1
Beans Beans (1 = beans, 0 = otherwise) 0.06 0 1
Pigeonpea Pigeonpea grain (1 = pigeonpea grain, 0 = otherwise) 0.08 0 1
Chickpea Chickpea (1 = chickpea, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Greengram Greengram (1 = greengram, 0 = otherwise) 0.27 0 1
Cowpea Cowpea (1 = cowpea, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Cotton Cotton (1  = cotton, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Vegetables Vegetables (1 = vegetables, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Quality1 (reference) Quality of the crop sold (1 = above average, 0  = average) 0.08 0 1
Quality2 Quality of the crop sold (1 = average, 0 = above average) 0.92 0 1
District District (1 = Makueni, 0 = Mbeere) 0.16 0 1
District (reference) District (1 = Mbeere, 0 = Makueni) 0.84 0 1
Broker (reference) Broker/assembler buyer (1 = broker/assembler, 0 = otherwise) 0.38 0 1
Consumer Consumer buyer (1 = consumer, 0 = otherwise) 0.05 0 1
PMG PMG buyer (1 = PMG, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Rural wholesaler Rural wholesaler buyer (1 = rural wholesaler, 0 = otherwise) 0.45 0 1
Urban trader Urban trader buyer (1 = urban trader, 0 = otherwise) 0.02 0 1
Cotton ginnery Cotton ginnery buyer (1 = cotton ginnery, 0 = otherwise) 0.02 0 1
School School buyer (1 = schools, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Season1 Harvest season (1 = harvest, 0 = otherwise) 0.71 0 1
Season2 Some 2-3 months after harvest (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 0.19 0 1
Season3 (reference) Some 4-5 months after harvest (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 0.11 0 1
Gender Gender of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.84 0 1
Education Education of household head (years) 6.79 0 14
Own ICT Household owns ICT# (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.82 0 1
n  = 624 is the number of point transactions;
# ICT means Information and Communication Technology assets (eg, radio, television and mobile phone).
Source: Household survey 2005
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average quality grain is insignificant). This is a reflection of the classic case of asymmetric information
(Akerlof 1970) where buyers take the quality of a good to be uncertain and consider only average quality of
a good with the implication that suppliers of superior produce will be driven out of the market.
Indicating some differences in price across districts, farmers in Makueni district receive Ksh 2/kg less
than those in the reference Mbeere district (P < 0.01). This may be due to the relative proximity of Mbeere
district to Nairobi – a major urban market for agricultural produce across the country
(see Table 2). When we look at the different marketing channels, consumers, PMGs and schools
respectively paid about Ksh 7, Ksh 6, and about Ksh 4 over and above the prices paid by brokers/assemblers
(P < 0.01). The buying prices of rural wholesalers, urban traders and cotton ginneries are not significantly
different from those paid by the brokers. This shows that PMGs can be attractive market outlets for small
producers especially if they can resolve certain marketing constraints. The school feeding programs
(captured by the school variable) also seem to provide an alternative market outlet for farmers at prices
significantly higher than brokers (P < 0.01).
Controlling for crop type, market outlet distances, location, and the type of grain buyer, farmers selling
their produce at harvest (Season1) would lose about Ksh 1.5/kg compared to those who can afford to delay
selling for 4-5 months (reference season) after harvest (P < 0.1). However, the price differential for a 2-3
Table 13. Determinants of grain prices received by farmers (STATA results).
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P>|t|
Sold -0.001 0.001 -0.97 0.334
Sold squared 3.34x10-8 2.13x10-7 0.16 0.875
Distance 0.023 0.012 1.97 0.050
Beans 15.163 1.011 14.99 0.000
Pigeonpea 11.275 0.935 12.06 0.000
Chickpea 13.512 1.452 9.31 0.000
Greengram 12.321 0.634 19.45 0.000
Cowpea 4.061 1.359 2.99 0.003
Cotton 7.760 1.625 4.77 0.000
Vegetables 7.421 1.347 5.51 0.000
Quality 0.222 0.865 0.26 0.797
District -2.194 0.739 -2.97 0.003
Consumer 6.757 1.123 6.02 0.000
PMG 5.950 1.180 5.04 0.000
Rural wholesaler -0.614 0.513 -1.20 0.232
Urban trader 0.988 1.884 0.52 0.600
Cotton ginnery 1.017 2.093 0.49 0.627
School 3.570 1.341 2.66 0.008
Season1 -1.491 0.762 -1.96 0.051
Season2 -1.173 0.884 -1.33 0.185
Gender 0.553 0.680 0.81 0.417
Education -0.032 0.066 -0.49 0.622
Own ICT 0.056 0.650 0.09 0.932
Constant 13.914 1.421 9.79 0.000
N 624
F(23,600) 41.09
R2 0.612
Reference variables include: crop price = maize; quality = above average; District = Mbeere district; buyer = broker/assembler; season = 4-5
months after harvest.
Source: Household survey 2005
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months delay after harvest (Season2) is not significantly different from a 4-5 months delay. This implies that
storing grain would be beneficial to the farmers especially if the incremental price would offset the storage
costs including potential weight loss and pest attack. This shows that PMGs can exploit the seasonal price
variability by facilitating storage and bulk sales (to reduce unit storage costs) so that farmers can benefit
from better prices later in the season.
4.5. PMGs and price determination
Various factors may affect the buying and selling prices of a product differently depending on how the buyer
or seller ranks the factors on a given scale. With respect to PMGs, the prices they offer will determine their
attractiveness to members as a market outlet for their produce. Using group data, the mean and median
rankings of factors considered in setting buying and selling prices of the PMGs were analyzed.
The results show that prices offered by other traders (rank 2), season (rank 3), prevailing prices in
Nairobi and other urban centers (3.5), and product quality (rank 4) are the most important factors that the
PMGs take into account in determining grain buying prices (Table 14). However, prices in Nairobi and other
urban areas (rank 1), prices offered by other traders (rank 2), product quality (rank 3) and season (rank 4) are
important in determining the selling prices of PMGs. The importance of urban centers in determining PMGs
prices suggests some degree of grain market co-integration between the rural and urban markets.
Furthermore, the end users of the products in the marketing chain are generally located in the urban areas.
Farmer production costs are not highly ranked in determining PMG buying or selling prices. This means that
PMGs are grain price takers rather than price setters. Interestingly, the ranks seem to indicate that quality is
more important during selling rather than buying the products. The econometric analysis results presented
in Table 13 have confirmed that quality did not affect prices received by farmers.
Table 14. Rankings of determinants of buying and selling prices (where 1 = most important).
Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Factor Buying Selling Buying Selling Buying Selling
Price in Nairobi and/or other 5.6 (5) 2 (1) 2 (1) 1.4 (1) 3.8 (3.5) 1.7 (1)
  urban areas
Price offered by traders 4 (2) 2.6 (2) 2 (2) 2.8 (2) 1.8 (2) 3 (2)
Product quality 4.8 (4) 3.6 (3) 4.2 (4) 3.4 (3) 4.5 (4) 3.5 (3)
Season 6.6 (5) 5.2 (5) 2.2 (3) 2.8 (3) 4.1 (3) 4 (4)
Prices asked by farmers 6 (6) 4 (4) 5.4 (5) 4.8 (5) 5.7 (5.5) 4.4 (5)
Previous year price 7 (6) 6 (6.5) 5.2 (6) 5.8 (6) 5.7 (6) 5.7 (6)
Production cost 5.4 (6) 4.8 (5) 8 (8) 8 (8) 6.7 (8) 6.4 (8)
Transport cost 8 (8) 7.8 (8) 8 (8) 8 (8) 8 (8) 7.9 (8)
Figures in parentheses are medians; n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Although there is no price premium for quality, PMGs consider certain grain quality attributes when
buying from members. These attributes include pest attack, moisture content, foreign matter, grain color,
among others. These factors reflect the quality of the produce that is desired by the PMGs. The median
rankings show that pest attack (1), percentage of foreign matter in the grain (2.5), moisture content (3.5), grain
size (3.5), and grain color (4.5) are important attributes (Table 15). This is likely to affect the supply of quality
and differentiated products by small farmers as they lack the incentives in a market where prices reflect fair
average quality and there is no premium for superior quality products.
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When PMGs coordinate marketing functions, they need to cover the associated administration and other
transaction costs. Assembling, bulking, storage and marketing functions and the associated costs need to be explicitly
considered in determining the final price paid to farmers. For example, depending on the duration of storage, the
grain could lose weight through moisture loss, and hence the total quantity sold. The results show that farmers who
sold through the PMGs received, on average, between 90-95% of the PMG selling price (Table 16). The balance was
used by the PMGs to cover costs incurred in coordinating sales including transportation costs. This indicates a high
level of efficiency by the PMGs in their marketing functions.
Table 15. Mean and median rankings of pigeonpea quality attributes (where 1 = most important).
Attribute Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Pest attack 2.4 (2) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
Foreign matter 3.4 (4) 2.2 (2) 2.8 (2.5)
Moisture content 3.8 (4) 3.4 (3) 3.6 (3.5)
Grain size 3.6 (5) 3.4 (4) 3.5 (4)
Grain color 3.6 (3) 4.8 (5) 4.2 (4.5)
Smell 6.6 (6) 6 (6) 6.3 (6)
Field pests 5 (7) 7 (7) 6 (7)
Mixed varieties 6.6 (7) 7 (7) 6.8 (7)
Values in parentheses are medians; n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 16. Average PMG selling price and farmers’ final price (2003 and 2004).
Crop PMG selling price (Ksh/kg) Farmers’ final price (Ksh/kg) Farmer price (% of PMG price)
Maize 18 16 89
Dry pigeonpea grain 22 21 93
Green pigeonpea 14 13 90
Beans 40 20 50
Greengram 25 24 94
Kabuli chickpea 40 38 95
Desi chickpea 20 18 90
Source: PMG survey 2005
Another critical factor that determines the choice of marketing channels by farmers is the time lag
between delivery and receipt of payments for the delivered product. The delay in payments among different
buyers after grain delivery varied between instantaneous and five weeks (Table 17). Brokers/assemblers and
Table 17. Number of weeks taken for payment after sale by market participants.
Buyer Mean Number of transactions
Broker/assembler 0.0 237
School 0.0 19
Rural wholesaler 0.1 283
Consumer 0.1 33
Urban trader 0.1 13
Cotton ginnery 1.2 12
PMG 5.0 27
Total 0.3 624
Source: Household survey 2005
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schools paid on delivery, while rural wholesalers, urban traders and the cotton ginnery paid about a day after
delivery. In contrast, it took the PMGs five weeks to pay farmers after they had delivered their grain. Many
cash-constrained farmers who need cash to settle various commitments (eg, loans, schools fees and other
necessities) at the time of delivery often opt to sell their grain through other channels even if this means
relatively lower prices. One useful strategy for the PMGs to increase their market share would require that
they pay farmers at least a certain proportion of the grain value at the time of delivery pending full payments
after selling the grain at a higher price later.
4.6. Collective action and PMG performance
One major difficulty in collective action studies is to measure the level of collective action and how such
group action contributes to final performance outcomes. Generally there are no standardized measures or
indicators that can be used to assess the level, viability and effectiveness (performance) of collective action
(eg, Place et al. 2002). However, depending on the problem under investigation, certain indicators may be
identified as proxies for the differential level of collective action (those that capture the level of cooperation
or group action) and the degree of effectiveness of such collective action in attaining a group’s stated
objectives. This kind of separation allows us to assess the extent to which collective action can be attributed
to good performance in terms of final outcomes. Accordingly we use a qualitative approach based on an
in-depth study of the PMG operations to identify some indicators for the levels of collective action and its
effectiveness (performance).
The level of collective action across groups can be inferred by commitment attributes of the
individual members to the group activities and objectives. These may include the extent to which
individual members relate with other members of the group within the confines of the existing
institutional mechanisms and governance structures, and commitment or subscription to the group’s
ideals or the extent to which the individual members share a common vision. Accordingly, six indicators
of collective action were identified: the number of elections since formation, share of members
respecting the by-laws, attendance of meetings, annual member contributions to the group, cash capital
and agreed annual subscription fees. In order to facilitate comparison across groups, the indicators were
standardized in per capita or in percentage values.
The results using these indicators show that the level of collective action varied across PMGs
(Table 18). Elections are a means through which members can ensure that groups are managed effectively.
They are an indication that members are actively participating in group decisions which are monitored and
enforced collectively (McCarthy et al. 2002), which is a good measure of the level of collective action. The
groups conducted an election annually although in two groups (Nthingini and Kamwiyendeyi), elections
were conducted after two years, whereas Makima conducted elections biannually (indicating a higher level
of collective action).
By-laws define the obligation and the mode of interaction between members and the PMG leadership
for the smooth and effective running of the groups in the process of pursuing the groups’ objectives. Abiding
by the laws also reduces governance and coordination costs. The proportion of members who respect group
by-laws ranged between 50 and 100%. Half the PMGs reported that upwards of 75% of the members
adhered to the by-laws. PMGs like Makima, Emali and Thavu had higher values on this indicator. A related
indicator is the proportion of members attending general assembly meetings where important resolutions
are passed. It shows the level of involvement by individuals in the management and coordination of
collective action. The proportion of members who attended the general assembly meetings was 46-95%,
with 60% of the PMGs reporting less than 65% attendance. The good performers in this indicator include
Thavu, Kamwiyendeyi and Kathonzweni.
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Annual subscriptions can be used by PMGs to overcome working capital constraints in the course of their
operations. Member contributions are usually aimed at pooling resources for implementing a group project
where members have a common interest. Hence, the amount of annual subscriptions is a good indicator that
shows commitment on the part of the members towards the PMG objectives. Accordingly annual subscriptions
varied across the groups and were between Ksh 0-1800. High annual subscriptions are likely to lead to higher
capital investments by PMGs over time7. The per capita contributions in 2004 ranged between Ksh 0 and 264.
The per capita operating capital held in 2005 ranged between Ksh 0-319. Groups like Makima, Kathonzweni
and Kalamba performed best on these indicators.
Based on the selected six indicators for the level of collective action, the PMGs were ranked (1 = most
successful) according to the values of each indicator to identify those that are relatively more successful in
collective action, and also to identify the factors that contribute to good performance. A simple average rank was
then computed across the six indicators. Since we have assumed equal weights for these indicators for simplicity,
the PMGs below the average rank of 5 may be considered relatively more successful in collective action. The
mean rankings show that Kalamba (3.0), Makima (3.2), Kathonzweni (4.3) and Wango (4.8) were more
successful than the rest (Table 19). Kilia with a ranking of 6.8 was the least successful in terms of the level of
collective action. This shows that despite its simplicity, the average ranks indeed selected the PMGs that did well
in more than two or three of the collective action indicators.
To get insights on whether high levels of collective action lead to high level of performance in collective
outcomes, the PMGs were compared on the basis of two outcome indicators: total assets built over time and
total volume of grains traded (both standardized per member). The distribution of the levels of these indicators
across PMGs show that per capita assets were lowest in Nthingini (Ksh 34) and highest in Kathonzweni (about
Ksh 6393) while the per capita total sales for the 2003/04 ranged between a low of 3 kg in Thavu and 242 kg in
Kathonzweni (Table 20). When the sales are disaggregated by year, it becomes evident that some PMGs did
not trade in one year or another while some traded in both years. As consistency in grain marketing is a good
indicator of performance, the volume of trade is separately ranked for the two years. The aggregate rankings
across the three indicators (ie, combining assets built over time and crop sales per capita) show that
Kathonzweni (1.3), Kalamba (3.3) and Makima (3.5) have performed much better than PMGs like Emali,
Table 20. Selected indicators of performance of collective action.
Per capita sales volume Per capita total sales
Per capita assets built (kg/member) volume (kg/member)
PMG over time (Ksh/member) 2003* 2004 2003-04
Wango 63 - 8 8
Nthingini 34 - 7 7
Kilia 177 34 23 57
Kamwiyendeyi 333 192 0 192
Makima 301 - 123 123
Emali 268 92 0 92
Thavu 395 3 0 3
Kathonzweni 6393 212 30 242
Kalamba 3130 46 8 54
KYM 335 10 0 10
* Missing values indicate that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year.
Source: PMG survey 2005
7 High subscription or membership fees may also lead to exclusion of the poor with potentially negative distributive impacts for marginal and
vulnerable groups.
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Thavu, KYM (6.7) and Nthingini (7.5) (Table 21). Qualitative discussions and frequent observations during
the field survey also identified these three PMGs as the best performers both in terms of the level of collective
action and the marketing functions.
Assuming that performance is a function of the level of collective action and other factors (eg, distance
to markets), a simple graphical analysis of the drivers of performance (both positive and negative) was
undertaken. The results show that the number of elections held, initial start-up capital and membership fees
are important positive correlates with PMG performance (Figure 4). Corollary to the effects of positive
Table 21. Rankings of PMGs based on performance indicators (where 1 = most successful).
Per capita asset Per capita sales Per capita sales Mean
PMG built over time (2003)* (2004) Per capita crop sales Aggregate
Kathonzweni 1 1 2 1.5 1.3
Kalamba 2 4 4 4.0 3.3
Makima 6 - 1 1.0 3.5
Kilia 8 5 3 4.0 5.3
Kamwiyendeyi 4 2 10 6.0 5.3
Wango 9 - 4 4.0 6.5
Emali 7 3 10 6.5 6.7
Thavu 3 7 10 8.5 6.7
KYM 4 6 10 8.0 6.7
Nthingini 10 - 5 5.0 7.5
* Missing values indicate that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Figure 4. Some drivers of PMG performance.
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drivers, the number of villages covered by the PMG, distance to markets (grain wholesalers and district
commercial centers), and group size seem to be negatively associated with the effectiveness of marketing
functions of the PMGs (Figure 5). The number of villages covered by a PMG is highest for Emali, but
relatively smaller for Makima, Kathonzweni and Kalamba, the more successful PMGs. The distance to
wholesalers is shortest for Makima and Kathonzweni, located close to rural market centers, but higher for
Nthingini, Kalamba, Kilia and KYM. The poorly-performing PMGs, Nthingini, Kamwiyendei and Wango,
are also located far from the district commercial center. Moreover, the better performing PMGs like
Makima, Kathonzweni, and Kalamba had relatively smaller group sizes compared to poor performers,
Kilia, Nthingini and Emali. Consistent with the findings reported by McCarthy et al. (2002), group
performance seemed to decline with increase in distance to markets. These results indicate that proximity to
markets is likely to improve marketing functions and competitive behavior through better access to market
information that would help PMGs make informed decisions on buying and selling prices, and better
advertise their stock to wholesalers or other agents. It also shows that shorter distance to service centers and
buyers at the end of the marketing chain is likely to enhance the degree of complementarity between PMGs
and private enterprises.
Although group size has been shown to be positively correlated to performance (Place et al. 2002), the
qualitative evidence provided here shows that this may not necessarily be the case. Effective group size is
likely to vary by the type of collective action. In addition, group size may have a non-linear relationship
with performance which would suggests that medium sized groups are more likely to succeed than very
small groups or very large groups (Agrawal and Goyal 2001), depending on transaction, organizational
and managerial costs of cooperation (Hussi et al. 1993). An optimal group size will be one that minimizes
these costs, and improves the coordination of production and marketing functions. The challenge for the
PMGs would be how to determine the effective group size that would be big enough to exploit economies
of scale, without leading to coordination failure and prevalence of conflicts. Generally, the negative
correlates jointly constrain coordination of production and the marketing functions of the PMGs. Long
distance implies geographical isolation, while group size and the number of villages covered by a single
PMG could be associated with higher transaction costs, coordination failure and lack of cohesion or
shared goals and values.
Figure 5. Negative correlates with PMG performance.
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4.7. Constraints to collective marketing
For the PMGs to be effective and successful in their collective marketing functions, constraints to their
operations will have to be addressed. The median rank for the three most important constraints to collective
marketing was given as: lack of credit (1), price variability (3) and low volumes (3)
(Table 22). In addition, lack of buyers (4) and low business skills (6) appear to be relatively important. The
prominence of lack of credit as a major constraint to collective marketing is consistent with the wide
recognition that this service can play an important role for marketing and enterprise development (eg,
Bingen et al. 1993; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo 2002) and for remedying market imperfections associated with
risk and imperfect information (eg, Poulton et al. 1998; Kelly et al. 2003). Nonetheless, there are three
approaches through which constrained access to credit by PMGs can be addressed, namely: rural micro-
credit facilities, contract or outgrower schemes, and inventory credit (see Kindness and Gordon 2001).
Table 22. Rankings of PMG collective marketing constraints (where 1 = most important).
Constraint Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Lack of credit 1.4 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1)
Price variability 4.6 (5) 2.6 (2) 3.6 (3)
Low volumes 4.8 (3) 3.2 (3) 4.0 (3)
Lack of buyers 5.4 (4) 4.0 (4) 4.7 (4)
Low business skills 4.8 (6) 6.0 (6) 5.4 (6)
Low quality 7.2 (7) 6.2 (6) 6.7 (7)
Storage pests 7.6 (8) 7.6 (7) 7.6 (7.5)
Internal conflicts 8.0 (8) 8.2 (8) 8.1 (8)
Poor leadership 7.8 (9) 9.6 (10) 8.7 (9)
Lack of storage 11.3 (12) 8.2 (7) 9.4 (10)
Theft in storage 10.8 (11) 11.2 (12) 11.0 (11)
Figures in parentheses are medians; and n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Micro-credit schemes are a response to market failure in conventional banking services for the rural
poor. They are associated with group lending since individual farmers rarely have bankable assets that can
be used as collateral against formal loans. In addition, individual market transactions are largely informal
such that formal banks are unable to collect information on prices independently. But peer pressure can
effectively substitute for collateral, as group members are likely to take action to prevent a fellow member
from defaulting. With a lead model demonstrated by the Grameen bank in Bangladesh, there are now several
successful examples across Africa (eg, K-Rep Bank in Kenya). The disadvantage of such schemes is that
their operations are normally subsidized such that the sustainability of their operations is not guaranteed in
the long term. In addition, the size of loans may be small to provide capital required for grain marketing.
Selective subsidies may, however, be needed to ‘kick-start’ agricultural markets as they play an important
role in relieving critical seasonal and cash constraints, and reducing market and input supply uncertainties
(Dorward et al. 2004a).
In relation to contract or outgrower schemes, processors or exporters can provide financial resources to
farmers, with the latter undertaking to supply grain under conditions specified in advance (futures) contracts
that often specify volumes, prices and time. Farmer organizations and PMGs can play a vital role in
facilitating such contractual arrangements with the private sector in a manner that would be mutually
beneficial to farmers and contractors: farmers will be able to sell their produce through the PMGs knowing
that they will be paid promptly; the PMGs will be able to access capital from the private sector that would
improve the viability of their business; and the processor will be guaranteed timely supply of required
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quantity and quality of grain. The viability of such an arrangement would depend on three factors: i) how
PMGs operate as a business, ii) the extent to which they would be able to produce quality products in the
desired quantity and time, and iii) the legal and institutional framework for contract formation and
enforcement. The latter is critical as many contract farming arrangements suffer from non-binding contracts
and lack of arbitration and enforcement mechanisms.
An inventory credit (also called warehouse credit) system is another option for providing credit services
to PMGs. There are three players involved in this arrangement: the farmer, the PMG and a bank. The
warehouse, which can also be operated by a PMG or a third party, can be used to store grain supplied by
farmers with a formal bank lending a certain percentage of the grain value at the time of harvest. The PMG
can use the loan to pay the farmers as well as acquire additional stocks with a plan to repay the loan later
after selling the grain at higher prices during the low supply season. This option could be particularly
attractive as the logistics are relatively simple and it is widely practiced in Africa. However, the success of
such an arrangement will depend on the requisite institutional mechanisms which include the willingness of
the banks to lend against inventories, warehouse systems that can operate within the necessary legal
framework, and supportive and enforceable legal institutions.
The challenge of price variability to collective marketing can be explained by supply variations and
weak market linkages. Reduced supply in rainfed agriculture is generally occasioned by low rainfall or
drought occurrences. Investment in water harvesting technologies (eg, watershed management) can be a
suitable strategy to mitigate supply variations and subsequent price fluctuations. While unpredictable price
fluctuations can be detrimental to collective efforts, seasonal price differences associated with production
and supply patterns may be predictable. The PMGs could turn such seasonal price changes to their
advantage by storing the grain until the prices are high. This can be effectively done by the PMGs once the
binding credit problem has been addressed through alternative institutional arrangements. The challenge of
low volumes requires a different strategy that would help procure products over a wider catchment area.
This requires coordination of marketing functions at a higher level of organization (eg, a union of PMGs)
that would also allow spreading of the administrative and logistical costs. Economic viability of PMGs
under changing market conditions will also require improvements in business skills and entrepreneurship.
This is particularly important at the initial stages when such capacity is lacking. While private service
providers may gradually take this role as the PMGs grow, external support would be critical at initial stages
to PMGs for training in organization, management, entrepreneurship and marketing functions. The
knowledge and skills gained would equip the PMGs with the capacity to initiate and sustain profitable
commercial relationships with the private sector and financial institutions (Bingen et al. 2003).
5. Legal and policy issues for collective marketing
Given the low level of market development and lack of service providers in many rural areas, the PMGs are
unlikely to prosper in a “business as usual” policy environment. An appropriate policy environment that
would spur PMG growth will include an enabling legal framework, support to access market information,
support to strengthen business skills, and access to essential finance and credit facilities. As is the standard
practice for rural groups in Kenya, the PMGs were registered as self-help groups (SHGs) as required by the
Kenyan law. Accordingly, the PMGs lack legal status as business enterprises, which is likely to constrain
their development and competitiveness under the liberalized market structure. Their registration as social
groups rather than business enterprises restricts access to essential credit from formal financial institutions
– a major collective marketing constraint identified by the PMGs. Their lack of legal status as business
enterprises means that they can neither sue nor be sued in case of any liability. This drastically diminishes
the incentive for financial institutions to do business with PMGs in terms of providing essential financial
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services (credit, insurance, etc). Hence, legal recognition as business entities is a prerequisite to place them
in a better position for accessing complimentary services which are critical for their development.
Moreover, agricultural marketing systems require rules and regulations that facilitate contract
formation and exchange. According to the Kenya Cooperative Societies amendment bill, Article 28, 2004, a
cooperative society is required to have a committee of between five and nine members (Republic of Kenya
2004)8. The committee is empowered to enter into contracts and carry out other business functions in
accordance with the established by-laws. Based on this article, the PMGs can transit quickly from self help
groups into cooperatives. The act empowers the members to be responsible for their own registered
cooperative societies and stress on the need for the cooperatives, through their elected committees, to run
their societies in accordance with internationally accepted cooperative principles. The relationship between
societies and the government is through the commissioner of cooperatives, who is responsible for the
cooperative development and growth and provides organization, registration, operation, advancement and
dissolution services. Manyara (2003) argues that government controls are justifiable to restore regulatory
controls for the sector to be sustainable, but Argwings-Kodhek (2004) contends that the amendments seem
to be referring more to a typical troubled agricultural marketing cooperative or generally a small rural crop
marketing-based cooperative. Nevertheless, the amended act would appear to provide for a stronger
regulatory framework within which cooperative societies can operate but it fails to provide sufficient
mechanism for those now registered as welfare groups to transit into cooperative societies. The strong
regulatory framework stipulated in the act without proper mechanisms for facilitating and supporting
younger cooperative societies and farmer organizations could also inhibit further development and
competitiveness.9
A framework that seeks to promote, guide and discipline the operation of markets may also be required
to enhance PMG operations. Typical examples will include laws dealing with good agricultural practice,
environmental and consumer protection to motivate corporate social responsibility and accountability. Such
a framework will need to address constraints to development and sustainability of the PMGs based on their
core function of collective marketing which will be critical to their growth and effectiveness. As discussed
earlier, low volumes, low business skills and lack of storage facilities are some of the critical constraints to
collective marketing. The low volume problem is a further justification for the establishment of an umbrella
union or confederation of PMGs which can horizontally and vertically coordinate the marketing functions
of the member PMGs. This will be an essential strategy for the PMGs to reduce transaction costs while also
reducing their fixed administration costs through better vertical and horizontal coordination of output and
input marketing functions.
6. Conclusions
Market liberalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition to increase access to markets by smallholder
farmers in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The expected positive response by the private sector in
many areas with limited market infrastructure has however been disappointing, leaving a large number of
smallholder farmers under subsistence production and, therefore, unable to benefit from liberalized
markets. Structural problems of poor infrastructure and lack of market institutions needed to fill the vacuum
8 The supplement contains amendments to the Cooperatives Act No. 12 of 1997, which too was a result of an amendment of the Cooperative
Societies Cap. 490 of 1966. In an effort to enhance the policy and legal framework for the functioning of cooperatives, the Kenyan government
has gradually introduced these two amendments. The latest amendments were motivated by the need to enable cooperative societies operate as
business entities.
9 The framework requires that societies elect new office bearers annually, maintain financial statements that meet international standards and
prepare and submit annual statement of accounts audited by an auditor approved by the government. Failure to meet these requirements or meet
stated objectives may lead to dissolution.
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left when governments withdrew from markets in the process of liberalization contribute to high transaction
costs, coordination failure and pervasive market imperfections. This realization has necessitated new kinds
of institutional arrangements to enhance the uptake of market-oriented and productivity-enhancing
technologies, link farmers to markets and foster market participation and commercialization of smallholder
production. One of these institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and
formation of collective marketing groups as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural
economies.
The analysis presented here has shown that while collective action – embodied in PMGs – is feasible
and useful, external shocks and structural constraints in the system require farmer organization and
coordination mechanisms at a higher scale to exploit scale economies. Recurrent droughts in semi-arid areas
and low productivity of soils reduce marketable surplus and increase vulnerability and attenuate the benefits
of collective action. The continued existence of PMGs under such circumstances depends on the ability to
organize farmers at a higher level of coordination (eg, district), and their ability to tackle technological and
financial problems that now limit crop yields and the amount procured in a given season.
It is evident that marketing channels in the study areas are characterized by long and complex marketing
chains and high transaction costs which considerably lower the farmers’ share of the consumer price.
Producer marketing groups have the potential to simplify and shorten the marketing chain by directly
connecting small producers to secondary and tertiary markets; better coordinate production and marketing
activities and facilitate farmer access to production inputs at fair prices. Even so, only relatively successful
PMGs will be able to exploit this potential. The effectiveness of this collective action was reflected in the
larger volumes of grain transacted and capital assets held by the group. The effectiveness of collective
action in terms of these performance indicators was found to be a function of the level of collective action in
the form of increased participatory decision making, member contributions to the PMG, and initial start-up
capital. Hence, better performing groups in terms of collective marketing, showed evidence of high levels of
collective action. The higher the levels of collective action, the more successful the PMGs were in terms of
monetized per capita assets built over time and also the per capita grain volumes traded. The number of
elections held, initial start-up capital and membership fees were all positively associated with group
performance, while the number of villages covered by the PMGs, distances to markets and group size seem
to have the opposite effect on group performance.
The challenge therefore is to sensitize members on the democratic principles of participatory group
governance through elections, to provide initial start-up capital to kick-start their operations, and to
encourage members to increase their registration fees for membership to raise the necessary minimum
capital. This calls for interventions that will improve governance and democratization of the PMGs; solicit
for external support in establishing a start-up capital base; and encourage increased annual contributions to
the PMGs by the membership. This will need to be coupled with training of managers and possibly members
of the PMGs in business skills to facilitate effectiveness and accountability in running the PMGs as business
enterprises. In addition the PMGs have to be registered as legal business entities and not as self-help groups,
which restricts their ability to access essential business services.
Although the PMGs demonstrated that they could fill gaps in the marketing channels and pay better
prices to farmers, their effectiveness was hampered by their lack of cash capital to pay for produce deliveries
by farmers. The brokers and rural wholesalers who can pay cash on delivery were still dominant market
participants in rural grain markets. The PMGs on average required some five weeks to pay the farmers after
grain delivery. Cash constrained farmers find it very difficult to wait for that long, even when the PMGs
would eventually be in a position to pay prices significantly higher than other buyers. Hence many small
producers choose to sell their grain to other traders although this may mean receiving lower prices.
Therefore, until the PMGs are able to pay promptly for deliveries made (even if it means a proportion of the
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final price) small producers will not be in a position to benefit from market opportunities opened through
collective action. There is thus a need to enhance the ability of the PMGs to access working capital through
access to financial credit. An innovative strategy would be to use the PMG crop inventory before sale as
collateral for financial credit and to subsequently encourage formal financial institutions to extend
warehouse or inventory credit services to PMGs. This is critical to enable PMGs to overcome the binding
liquidity constraints and facilitate effective coordination of the marketing functions for small producers.
In addition to credit, experiences in eastern Kenya show that collective marketing activities are
constrained by low volumes, price variability and low business skills. The formation of an umbrella union of
PMGs may help in addressing the problems of low volumes, price variability and the lack of credit. Low
transacted volumes are attributed to delivering of small quantities of grain by producers. This may be due to
drought conditions, low productivity of traditional agriculture and weak incentives to sell through PMGs.
Moreover, the farmers are scattered over a wide area making coordination costly and difficult. This calls for
enhanced institutional arrangements for better vertical and horizontal coordination of marketing functions
according to manageable spatial units. A union of PMGs (under an umbrella body) may ease the market
coordination constraint, thus lowering coordination costs. This option would enable PMGs to vertically
coordinate transactions in addition to facilitating access to a broad range of buyers at the upper end of the
marketing chain. The seasonal price variability may also be exploited through bulking and storage during
periods of excess supply and selling when prices improve as the supply diminishes. The alternative option
for smoothing supply will require investments in drought mitigating and water harvesting techniques that
would enable farmers in drought-prone areas manage production risk more effectively. External support for
strengthening existing institutions and collective investments in integrated watershed management may also
generate significant economic and environmental benefits to the affected communities.
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Appendix 1. Producer marketing groups (PMGs) and study sites in Kenya
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Abstract
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have liberalized markets to improve efficiency and enhance market linkages for
smallholder farmers. The expected positive response by the private sector in areas with limited market infrastructure
has however been disappointing. The functioning of markets is constrained by high transaction costs and coordination
problems along the production-to-consumption value chain. New kinds of institutional arrangements are needed to
reduce these costs and fill the vacuum left when governments withdrew from markets in the era of structural adjustments.
One of these institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and formation of collective
marketing groups as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural economies. The analysis presented here
with a case study from eastern Kenya has shown that while collective action – embodied in Producer Marketing
Groups (PMGs) – is feasible and useful, external shocks and structural constraints that limit the volume of trade and
access to capital and information require investments in complementary institutions and coordination mechanisms to
exploit scale economies. The effectiveness of PMGs was determined by the level of collective action in the form of
increased participatory decision making, member contributions and initial start-up capital. Failure to pay on delivery,
resulting from lack of capital credit, is a major constraint that stifles PMG competitiveness relative to other buyers.
These findings call for interventions that improve governance and participation; mechanisms for improving access to
operating capital; and effective strategies for risk management and enhancing the business skills of the PMGs.
About ICRISAT
The semi-arid tropics (SAT) encompass parts of 48 developing countries including most of India,
parts of Southeast Asia, a swathe across sub-Saharan Africa, much of southern and eastern Africa,
and parts of Latin America. Many of these countries are among the poorest in the world.
Approximately one sixth of the world’s population lives in the SAT, which is typified by
unpredictable weather, limited and erratic rainfall and nutrient-poor soils.
ICRISAT’s mandate crops are sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea and groundnut – five
crops vital to life for the ever-increasing populations of the SAT. ICRISAT’s mission is to conduct
research that can lead to enhanced sustainable production of these crops and to improved
management of the limited natural resources of the SAT. ICRISAT communicates information on
technologies as they are developed through workshops, networks, training, library services and
publishing.
The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) is a non-profit,
non-political organization belonging to the Alliance of Centers supported by the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Established in 1972, ICRISAT generates
and shares cutting edge technologies that support the livelihoods of more than 300 million people -
the poorest of the poor in semi-arid areas of the developing world.
©2006  by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
All rights reserved. Except for quotations of short passages for the purposes of criticism or review, no part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in retrieval systems, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
prior permission from ICRISAT. It is hoped this copyright declaration will not diminish the bona fide use of research findings in agricultural
research and development.
Résumé
De nombreux pays de l’Afrique au Sud du Sahara ont libéralisé leur marché dans le but d’améliorer l’efficacité et de
renforcer les liens commerciaux entre les petits exploitants agricoles. La réponse positive que le secteur privé attend
dans les régions où les infrastructures commerciales sont limitées, n’a cependant pas été celle espérée. Le fonctionnement
du marché est limité par les coûts de transaction élevés et par des problèmes de coordination qui se posent tout au long
de la chaîne de valeur production-consommation. Dans cette période d’ajustement structurel, de nouveaux types
d’arrangements institutionnels sont nécessaires pour réduire ces coûts et pour combler le vide laissé par le retrait du
gouvernement des marchés. L’une de ces innovations institutionnelles a consisté à renforcer les associations de
producteurs et la formation de coopératives de commercialisation qui serviront d’instruments permettant de pallier les
lacunes découlant de l’ouverture du marché, dans les économies de type rural. L’analyse présentée – en l’occurrence
une étude de cas du Kenya oriental – a montré que les chocs externes et les contraintes structurelles qui limitent le
volume des échanges commerciaux et l’accès au capital et à l’information, nécessitent des investissements dans des
institutions complémentaires et des mécanismes de coordination de manière à réaliser les économies de marché, même
si l’action collective – incarnée par les coopératives de commercialisation des producteurs (PMG) – est possible et
utile. L’efficacité des PMG est déterminée par le niveau d’action collective, qui prend la forme d’une prise de décision
participative et accrue, par les cotisations des membres et par le capital initial de démarrage. L’incapacité à payer à la
livraison, du fait du manque de crédits importants, est une contrainte majeure qui entrave la compétitivité des groupes
de commercialisation des producteurs par rapport aux autres acheteurs. Ces constats nécessitent : des interventions
permettant d’améliorer la gouvernance et la participation ; des mécanismes visant à faciliter l’accès au fonds
d’exploitation ; des stratégies efficaces pour la gestion des risques et le renforcement des compétences des coopératives
dans le domaine de la pratique des affaires.
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